Decoding the CCP jargon, what emerges from Xi’s statement in Urumqi is that genocide should continue.
by Kok Bayraq
During his visit to East Turkestan (Xinjiang to China) last month, Xi Jinping described the current situation in the region as a “hard-won stability.” However, he did not clarify this expression, which smelled of both pride and whine. What might be the “hardships” that Beijing’s tyrant mentioned in his speech?
Xi Jinping’s tool of choice to solve the “Uyghur issue” is—concentration camps. Chinese authorities have proudly and repeatedly claimed that violence in the region has dropped to zero since 2017. If this is true, the “victory” was achieved only because three million Uyghurs, most of whom were men of military age, were imprisoned. It seems that Xi Jinping had considered in advance the economic, technical, and moral costs of the internment of three million people, and had regarded them as acceptable.
Xi might have been right about the technical costs. Considering the military and police forces that have been formed in the Uyghur region for a long time, it is not impossible for 100,000 armed people to throw three million unarmed people into camps. It is enough to set aside law and conscience and risk the adverse consequences that may occur. It is also clear from China’s claim of “zero violence” that there was no harsh resistance from the Uyghurs while the camps were established and organized.
Considering the natural resources and strategic business location of the region, the economic costs of establishing and operating the camps should not be a problem either. Moreover, this point becomes even clearer when it is taken into account that the property of the businesspersons who were among the prisoners was confiscated and that food money and fines were taken from those detained in the camps.
There are other costs, though. Let’s look at the critical challenges. As mentioned earlier, these did not come from inside Chinese borders. The inhumane camp operation should have generated a reaction by the Han Chinese people in the region, at least for the safety of their future generations. However, Xi did not face any backlash or criticism from the Han Chinese, except that Wang Yongzhi, CCP secretary of Yarkant County, was found guilty of “serious disciplinary violations” when he released 7,000 detainees without Beijing’s permission. Of course, it was somewhat difficult to expect the Han Chinese in East Turkestan, some of whom are direct beneficiary of the current system, while others do not dare to protect even their own rights from the authoritarian regime, to say something on behalf of the Uyghurs.
Then, at what point did Xi experience “hardships”? I think that dealing with the stability, in other word, with the camp issue, Xi Jinping has encountered enormous difficulties—outside his country, in the international arena, not inside China.
In the past five years, twenty-two governments and Parliaments of North America and Europe have defined China’s Uyghur policy as genocide and a crime against humanity. Xi Jinping has affixed this cursed name to his nation for the first time in Chinese history. In order to erase this stain, China clashed with the USA and European countries in many areas, and the West and China imposed punitive sanctions on each other.
To avoid that the Uyghur genocide issue was brought to the United Nations’ table, the Chinese took the developing countries with them by using their economic and diplomatic power. By creating and mobilizing more than nine hundred non-governmental organizations around the world, most of them fake, they demanded that the “Xinjiang Report” prepared by the UN last year should not be published.
China changed the course of UN Commissar Michael Bachelet’s Xinjiang trip, from an investigation to a friendly visit. It even changed her statement “I admire China’s economic development” to “I admire China’s human rights situation.” The CCP’s ideological affinity with Bachelet did not work either. At the last moment, as she was leaving her post, she published the Uyghur report. Although the report does not use the word genocide, the explanation of the problem in the text leads the reader to the conclusion that there is indeed a genocide.
China’s effort to cover up the Uyghur genocide through Muslim countries sometimes had unexpected results. Albanian Muslim researcher Olsi Yazichi, one of those taken to the orchestrated Xinjiang visits, told the world that the king was naked by saying “My Chinese friends, what you are doing is not vocational training, it is torture.” He shared his criticism with the world via YouTube.
Lastly, Pakistani politician Imran Khan, who is perhaps China’s closest partner in Asia, opened the curtain of Sino-Muslim cooperation by saying, “On Uyghur issues, we believe China’s version, not the West, because we need China’s help.” These words of Imran Khan, who admits that China is blackmailing Muslim states economically to keep them silent about the Uyghurs, are even more damning for the CCP than the American criticism of the genocide.
In other words, even though China was able to prevent the discussion of the Uyghur question at the United Nations by taking the poor and dictatorial countries with it, thus creating a numerical superiority, this effort itself revealed that China lacks self-confidence when it comes to present its propaganda version of what is happening in East Turkestan. Xi Jinping in Urumqi implicitly admitted it. Perhaps the majority of the member states of the United Nations are not in a position to publicly admit the truth on the issue—but they know what it is.
We do not know the economic cost for the CCP of covering up the Uyghur genocide. If we consider the $200,000 the CCP gave to one single United Nations bureaucrat, UN Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures and Human Tights Alena Douhan, who is from Belarus, for whitewashing the Uyghur genocide, we can imagine how much money was spent globally on this effort.
Yes, fighting against the truth is not easy. It is very difficult to maintain the false respect earned by lying. As a matter of fact, the Chinese officials are tired of making up lies, and making others believe it, and this is a deeper concern than economic costs. This is the whine revealed in Xi Jinping’s reference to “hard-won stability.”
Therefore, the true interpretation of his reference to a “hard-won stability” is: “We have maintained this stability through genocide, tarnishing our glory, tarnishing our image, and sometimes even tarnishing our pride. We have already paid a heavy price. There is no way back: we must stick to the results and should not hesitate to continue the genocide.”
The accuracy of this interpretation is confirmed by the following instructions included in Xi Jinping’s Urumqi speech: Improve the mechanism to eliminate the threat from the main source… Continue the fight against “terrorism” and separatism… Continue to Sinicization of Islam… Force the Uyghurs to accept a Chinese identity… Relocate Uyghurs to Chinese provinces and speed up the resettlement of Chinese immigrants into Uyghur areas… Tell the world the Chinese propaganda version of the “Xinjiang story.”
All of these instructions violate separate articles of the International Convention against Genocide. In fact, they are an order to continue the genocide regardless of what the world may say. Xi Jinping’s mention of a “hard-won stability” is, in essence, the justification of his decision to continue the Uyghur Genocide.