The court dissolved the Church based on “hypothetical” and “potential” rather than actual risks.
by Patricia Duval
Article 7 of 7. Read article 1, article 2, article 3, article 4, article 5, and article 6.
In addition to the alleged and artificially exaggerated harm caused to the public welfare, the Court held, based on the same reasoning, that there remained a risk that such practices of “improper donations solicitation” would recur in the future, and concluded that it was necessary to dissolve the religious association.
Necessity based on a potential risk
In the remainder of the decision, the Court set forth, over the course of a dozen pages, a series of findings regarding the alleged risk and concluded that: “Although the evidence does not clearly establish the existence of civil lawsuits or the like in which Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct carried out by the Church’s believers after the Shooting Incident in this case became an issue, there remains, even now, a risk that the Church’s believers may engage in Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct.”
Accordingly, the Court examined whether it was “necessary to order the dissolution of the religious association to prevent Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct by the believers.”
The High Court held: “And even now, after the Shooting Incident in this case: (1) the Appellant still does not acknowledge that the root cause of the Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct by believers lies in the Church; (2) it has not adopted effective Preventive Measures Against Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct; and (3) although it has adopted a measure reducing the budgeted amount of donation income, not only is it unclear whether that measure can be said to be effective as a Numerical Target Mitigation Measure, it is also recognized that there is a risk that, in the future, the Church may again raise the budgeted amount of donation income and require believers to solicit donations pursuant to numerical targets that cannot be attained through methods and modes of solicitation remaining within the bounds of social acceptability. If that occurs, there is a high likelihood that believers will engage in Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct to attain those numerical targets established by the Church.”
In short, the Court criticizes the Church for failing to acknowledge that the root cause of the improper solicitation lies within the Church itself—namely, in its operating budget and religious doctrine. And since it is unwilling to change these fundamental aspects, the only solution is to dissolve it.
And the Court found further: “However, in light of the reasoning set forth above, even if the Church were to receive recommendations or sanctions (…), it is difficult to think that the Church would acknowledge that the root cause of the Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct by believers lies in the Church, and then adopt, as fundamental and permanent measures, effective Preventive Measures Against Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct and Numerical Target Mitigation Measures.”
It held accordingly that “recommendations and sanctions (…) cannot be said to constitute an effective means of preventing Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct by the Church’s believers.”
And the High Court concluded: “No effective means of preventing Improper Donation Solicitation Conduct by the Church’s believers can be found other than a dissolution order against the Church.”
![Ms. Kiaki Kojima, the founder of the “Association of 2nd-Generation Believers [of the Unification Church] to Protect the Human Rights of Believers,” campaigning for religious liberty in Japan.](https://bitterwinter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/179218040.jpeg)
International human rights law—Japanese Constitution
Yet, under international human rights standards, the High Court did not demonstrate in any way that the dissolution measure was necessary in a democratic society.
On the contrary, since the events in question occurred a long time ago and all the alleged risks are based on pure speculation, they demonstrate that the measure was neither necessary nor proportionate to the aim pursued.
In the case mentioned in this series of “Vladimir Yurlov and others v. the Russian Federation,” the UN Human Rights Committee held in 2023 that the dissolution of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ local association violated not only the believers’ right to freedom to manifest their religion, but also their right to freedom of association pursuant to Article 22 of the Covenant.
The Committee reiterated the principles of its case law regarding dissolution: “Pursuant to article 22 (2) of the Covenant, any restriction on the right to freedom of association must meet the following conditions: (a) it must be prescribed by law; (b) it must be imposed only for one of the purposes set out in article 22 (2); and (c) it must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for achieving one of those purposes. The reference to ‘a democratic society’ in the context of article 22 indicates, in the Committee’s opinion, that the existence of operational associations, including those that peacefully promote ideas that are not necessarily favorably viewed by the Government or the majority of the population, is the cornerstone of any society.”
And after reviewing the justifications of the Russian Federation, the Committee ruled: “However, the State party failed to specify how the storage and distribution of a few copies of banned publications endangered the rights of others and the security of the State. The State party did not invoke any concrete argument to justify the application of such an extreme measure as the dissolution of the organization.”
Similarly, even if the religious doctrine of the Unification Church is not favorably viewed by the Government or the majority of the population, this does not entitle the courts to assess it and dissolve the religious entity accordingly.
Similarly, the Japanese courts and the government failed to provide any concrete argument to justify the application of such an extreme measure as the dissolution of the association.
Consequently, the Tokyo High Court’s decision to dissolve the religious association of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society.
It therefore constitutes an impermissible interference with the rights of the believers to freedom of religion or belief, freedom of association, and freedom of expression as guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This represents a violation of Article 98, para. 2 of the Japanese Constitution.
Patricia Duval is an attorney and a member of the Paris Bar. She has a Master in Public Law from La Sorbonne University, and specializes in international human rights law. She has defended the rights of minorities of religion or belief in domestic and international fora, and before international institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the United Nations. She has also published numerous scholarly articles on freedom of religion or belief.
