By filing for dissolution of the religious corporation, the Japanese government clearly violated international law.
by Patricia Duval
Article 1 of 5.
This series reviews the conformity of the case the Japanese government has filed seeking the dissolution of the religious corporation Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU, formerly the Unification Church; hereafter the “Unification Church” or “the Church” or “the UC” for ease of understanding) to Japan’s international human rights commitments.
I consider the case as a limitation to the right to manifest one’s religion or belief and will address the following points:
- its non-conformity to the requirement of being “prescribed by law,”
- the imprecision and inadequacy of the notions of “public welfare” and “social norms” to limit this fundamental right, and
- the unfairness of the tort trials on which the dissolution request is based, in cases initiated by “deprogrammed” members and decided by the civil courts with the preconceived idea of mental manipulation or undue influence by the religious corporation.
On 13 October 2023, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (“MEXT”), which oversees Religious Corporations in Japan, filed for dissolution of the Unification Church.
MEXT’s plea for dissolution is based on Article 81(i) of the Law on Religious Corporations which provides that a court may order the dissolution of a religious corporation if it finds that “in violation of laws and regulations, the corporation commits an act which is clearly found to harm public welfare substantially.”
In its plea, MEXT claims the following: “From around 1980 to 2023, UC believers caused significant damage to many people by making them donate or buy goods by restricting their free decision and preventing their normal judgment, which resulted in disrupting the peaceful life of many people including the family members of the guests [newcomers to the Church] by means of the following conducts.”
There follows a description of the solicitation of donations by UC members, allegedly making potential donors anxious by talking about karma, thereby infringing their free will by exerting undue influence, and soliciting donations in amounts deemed to violate “social norms.”
MEXT’s grounds for its claim are thirty-two tort cases lost by the UC where the courts found its solicitation of donations tortious as it violated social norms or exceeded social acceptability and granted damages to the former donors.
It refers in particular to the ruling of Tokyo District Court of 15 January 2008, which examined the solicitation of donations and found that “it cannot be said that the actions were based on the actor’s free will according to societal norms.”
Based on these findings, MEXT concludes that UC believers caused significant damage to public welfare, under Article 81 of the Religious Corporations Law, by “disrupting the peaceful life of many people including family members.”
These grounds are flawed under international human rights law and treaties that Japan has committed to.
Article 18.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter the “Covenant” or “ICCPR”) provides an exhaustive list of limitations which can be brought to freedom of religion or belief: “3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”
First, if the restriction to UC believers’ right to manifest their religion through the dissolution of their religious corporation is based on a law (Article 81mentioned above), this law provides for the need of a “violation of laws and regulations,” which does not include “violation of social norms.”
Therefore, the requested dissolution of UC’s religious corporation cannot be said to be “prescribed by law” as required under Article 18.3 of the Covenant.
Second, the protection of “public welfare” is not amongst the restrictions permitted under Article 18.3 of the Covenant, which are to be strictly construed. “Public welfare” is in itself an aberration in matters of freedom of religion or belief based on individual choices, and religious practices cannot be assessed in terms of social norms.
Disrupting the peaceful life of others, including family, is not, as such, a valid ground for restricting the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.
It thus cannot be used for ordering the dissolution of a religious corporation, an extreme measure which is tantamount to the death penalty for a legal entity, particularly when it comes to an assembly of the faithful.
