Beijing’ growing interest in the Arctic poses new threats to the world. It is the result of a long-term strategy and a cooperation with Russia.
by Marco Respinti
Article 1 of 2.
When the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) is at issue, even the Arctic may become a subject for ideological controversy. In recent years, Beijing’s policies and actions towards the North Pole have grown steadily, culminating with the acceptance of the PRC as an Observer to the Arctic Council in 2013. The first ever Chinese Arctic government policy paper in 2018 stressed the PRC’s commitment to upholding the institutional and legal framework for Arctic governance and to respecting the sovereign rights of the Arctic states.
But this is only one side of that “white paper.” The other side may be glimpsed by reading thought its lines, as it is always needed when confronted with the ambiguous language of the Chinese authorities. In fact, by accepting the international legal state of the affairs on the Arctic, Beijing also asserted its own right as a non-Arctic state to participate in Arctic affairs under international law—a highly significant development. It would mean a lot for any country, and it does so especially for the PRC.
Beijing’s Arctic policy suggests in fact a strong desire to push for the internationalization of the Arctic’s regional governance system. And while the “white paper” is not a strategy document, it is even more interesting for what it omits than for what it openly states. The national security concern, a major driver of the PRC’s ambitions in the glacial region, is a case in point.
Beijing’s tryst with the Arctic
While the Chinese regime’s acceleration in the participation in Arctic international co-operation is fairly recent, all started when the country became a party to the “Spitsbergen Treaty,” later known as the “Svalbard Treaty,” in 1925, which recognized the sovereignty of Norway over the archipelago of Svalbard, at the time called Spitsbergen.
Later on, in 1996, Beijing entered the International Arctic Science Committee. However, it was only in 2007 that it did start sending delegations to the meetings of the Arctic Council, the predominant inter-governmental forum for the discussion on that extreme region’s issues. During the years immediately preceding the PRC’s acceptance as a formal observer in the Arctic Council, there was a noticeable uptick of media reports and academic studies regarding the country’s emerging policies in the Arctic, including references to the PRC as both a “near-Arctic State” (近北极国家) and an “Arctic stakeholder” (北极利害关系国), despite the fact that the country does not have an Arctic border. The nearest Chinese location to the Arctic Circle is in fact in Mohe County (漠河县), Heilongjiang province, at 53°33’ N, that is to say, more than 1,400 kilometers from the Circle.
As mentioned earlier, Beijing recognizes the sovereignty of Arctic states—or the states that “have territories within the Arctic and thus carry the role as stewards of the region” as the Arctic Council established—but simultaneously applies standard interpretations of international law aimed at legalizing the presence of extra-regional states there.
While the PRC consistently frames its engagement in the region as a strategy of mutually beneficial cooperation, some Arctic countries have raised significant concerns about its growing economic presence, warning that Beijing may leverage its geopolitical influence to change the existing norms and rules in the polar region.
Meanwhile, the Arctic has also become an area of growing cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation. The Sino-Russian joint statement of February 2022 declares: “The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.” This mention of the Arctic is the first of its kind in a Sino-Russian joint statement. It arguably indicates how a weakened Russia increasingly dependent on China could be willing to compromise on its resistance toward allowing non-Arctic states to play a stronger role in the region.
Also, that very statement indicates that for the first time Beijing acknowledges that its Arctic interests are no longer limited to scientific research but extend to a variety of commercial activities. These are embedded in a new China-led cooperation initiative which aims to build a “Polar Silk Road” that connects China with Europe via the Arctic. It corresponds to one of two new “blue ocean passages,” extending from the PRC’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, launched in 2013.
In a speech given by the then Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Zhang Ming, at the Third Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, in October 2015, a brief, six-point plan for Beijing’s emerging Arctic policies was presented. It included the need for future exploration and knowledge about the region, the protection and “rational use” of the Arctic, respect for the inherent rights of Arctic states and indigenous peoples, respect for the rights of non-Arctic states and the international community, creation of a “multi-tiered co-operation framework for win-win results” in the region, and the need for continued observance of relevant international law and institutions, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the “Spitsbergen Treaty.”
The first three points were hardly ground-breaking and were assumed to be a normal stance by an Arctic Council observer state seeking to build an Arctic identity. However, the fourth, fifth, and sixth points were a tacit statement that the PRC wished and wishes to play a more central role in future Arctic affairs. This is clear from the Chinese commercial “salami-slicing” tactics in Norway and other Nordic states in the Arctic.
The case of Norway
Recently, the Norwegian government has called off a plan to sell the last privately owned piece of land on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard in order to prevent its acquisition by Beijing. The remote Sore Fagerfjord property consisting of mountains, plains and a glacier in south-west Svalbard was in fact on sale for euro 300 million. The archipelago, located halfway between mainland Norway and the North Pole, has indeed become a geopolitical and economic hotspot as while the ice melts relations grow ever frostier between Russia and the West.
Svalbard is governed under an unusual legal framework that allows foreign entities to gain footholds in the region. In fact, while the Treaty signed in 1920 recognizes Norwegian sovereignty, it also gives citizens of the signatory powers—which include the Russian Federation and the PRC—the same rights to exploit its mineral resources.
Per Kyllingstad, a lawyer who represents the sellers, said to the British daily “The Guardian” that he had received “concrete signs of interest” from Chinese potential buyers, who had “been showing a real interest in the Arctic and Svalbard for a long time.” He added that the sale was a unique occasion to grab the “last private land in Svalbard, and, to our knowledge, the last private land in the world’s high Arctic.” In 2016, Oslo paid euro 33.5 million to acquire the second-last piece of private land on Svalbard, near Longyearbyen, which was also reportedly being eyed by Chinese investors.
